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Quantum-locked key distribution at nearly the classical capacity rate
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Quantum data locking is a protocol that allows for a small secret key to (un)lock an exponentially larger
amount of information, hence yielding the strongest violation of the classical one-time pad encryption in the
quantum setting. This violation mirrors a large gap existing between two security criteria for quantum cryptog-
raphy quantified by two entropic quantities: the Holevo information and the accessible information. We show
that the latter becomes a sensible security criterion if an upper bound on the coherence time of the eavesdropper’s
quantum memory is known. Under this condition we introduce a protocol for secret key generation through a
memoryless qudit channel. For channels with enough symmetry, such as the d-dimensional erasure and depolar-
izing channels, this protocol allows secret key generation at an asymptotic rate as high as the classical capacity
minus one bit.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
Introduction.– A famous theorem of Shannon’s assesses the
security of one-time pad encryption, and shows that the secure
encryption of a message of n classical bits requires a key of
at least n bits [1]. When the message is encrypted in quan-
tum bits or qubits, by contrast, the phenomenon of quantum
data locking (QDL) [2–7] shows that the key required for se-
cure encryption of an n bit message can be much less than n.
In a typical QDL protocol, the legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob, publicly agree on a set of N = MK codewords in a
high-dimensional quantum system. From this set, they then
use a short shared private key of logK bits to select a set of
M codewords that they will use for sending information. In
the strongest QDL protocols known up to now, a key of con-
stant length of about O (log 1/ǫ) bits allows one to encrypt a
message of n bits, in such a way that if an eavesdropper Eve
intercepts and measures the quantum system, then she can-
not access more than about ǫn bits of information about the
message [6, 8].
A number of works have been devoted to the role of QDL
in physics and information theory [3–11]. However, only re-
cently has QDL been considered in the presence of noise. Fol-
lowing the idea of the “quantum enigma machine” [10] for ap-
plying QDL to cryptography, a formal definition of the locking
capacity of a communication channel has been recently intro-
duced in [11], as the maximum rate at which information can
be reliably and securely transmitted through a (noisy) quan-
tum channel. Unlike the private capacity (which requires the
communication to be secure according to the Holevo infor-
mation criterion), the locking capacity requires security ac-
cording to the accessible information criterion, possibly with
the assistance of a preshared secret key whose length grows
sublinearly in the number of channel uses. Since the Holevo
information is an upper bound on the accessible information,
the locking capacity is always larger than or equal to the pri-
vate capacity. Clearly, the locking capacity cannot exceed
the classical capacity (that is, the maximum rate for classical
communication without any privacy). Two notions of capac-
ity were defined in [11]: the weak locking capacity is defined
by requiring security against an eavesdropper who measures
the output of the complementary channel to the channel from
Alice to Bob (that is, she measures the environment of the
channel); the strong locking capacity is instead defined by as-
suming that the eavesdropper is able to measure the very input
of the channel. In general, the weak locking capacity is larger
than or at most equal to the strong locking capacity, as any
strong locking protocol also defines a weak locking one. As
shown in [12], there exist qudit channels with low (1 bit per
channel use) or even zero private capacity whose weak lock-
ing capacity is larger than 12 log d. In particular, the examples
in [12] refer to effectively noiseless channels whose classical
capacity is log d bits.
Here we introduce a protocol that allows high rate QDL
over a memoryless (noisy) qudit channel, and we apply it to
define a secret key generation protocol which is secure in the
sense of strong locking. The protocol allows secret key gen-
eration at a rate as high as the classical capacity minus one
bit, independently of the channel having any private capacity.
This result shows that by using a weaker security criterion (the
accessible information) one can increase the secret key gener-
ation rate up to almost the classical capacity. As explained
below, the accessible information becomes a sensible crite-
rion in a scenario where Alice and Bob know an upper bound
on the coherence time of Eve’s quantum memory.
Overview.– One of the most profound implications of QDL
in quantum information theory is the existence of a potentially
large gap between two security criteria for quantum cryptogra-
phy [13]. Suppose that Eve has access to the state ρE|x given
that the classical message x has been sent by Alice to Bob.
The widely accepted security criterion in quantum cryptogra-
phy requires that Eve’s state is ǫ-close to being a product state
in the operator trace norm [13], that is,∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρE|x − σ ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ , (1)
where ‖ · ‖1 = Tr| · |, pX(x) is the probability that the input
random variable X takes value x, σ =
∑
x pX(x)|x〉〈x|, and
ρE =
∑
x pX(x)ρE|x. By application of the Alicki-Fannes
inequality [14], Eq. (1) implies
χ (E) ≤ 4ǫ log |X |+ 2h2(ǫ) , (2)
where χ (E) := S (ρE) −
∑
x pX(x)S
(
ρE|x
)
is Holevo
2information of the ensemble of quantum states E =
{pX(x), ρE|x}, S(ρ) := −trρ log ρ denotes the von Neu-
mann entropy, |X | is the cardinality of the input variable X ,
and h2(ǫ) = −ǫ log ǫ− (1− ǫ) log (1− ǫ) denotes the binary
Shannon entropy. A fundamental feature of the Holevo infor-
mation is that it obeys the property of total proportionality [2].
This means that if Eve is given k bits (or k/2 qubits) of side
information about the message, then her Holevo information
cannot increase by more than k bits.
In the early days of quantum cryptography, the accessible
information criterion was used instead of the Holevo informa-
tion (see, e.g., [15]). This criterion requires that the result of
any measurement Eve can make on her share of the quantum
state is ǫ-close to being uncorrelated with the message. Sup-
pose that a measurementME→Xˆ maps ρE|x into the classical
variables Xˆ with conditional probability distribution pXˆ|X .
Then one considers the norm
sup
M
E→Xˆ
∥∥∥pXˆ|XpX − pXˆpX∥∥∥
1
:=
sup
M
E→Xˆ
∑
x,xˆ
∣∣∣pXˆ|X(xˆ|x)pX(x) − pXˆ(xˆ)pX(x)∣∣∣ , (3)
where pXˆ(xˆ) =
∑
x pXˆ|X(xˆ|x)pX(x). If (3) is less than ǫ,
then the Alicki-Fannes inequality implies [16]
Iacc (E) ≤ 4ǫ log |X |+ 2h2(ǫ) , (4)
where Iacc (E) := supM
E→Xˆ
I(X ; Xˆ) is the accessible in-
formation of the ensemble E = {pX(x), ρE|x}, I(X ; Xˆ) =
H(X)+H(Xˆ)−H(XXˆ) is the classical mutual information
between the message variable X and the measurement result
Xˆ , and H(X) = −∑x pX(x) log pX(x) denotes the Shan-
non entropy. Unlike the Holevo information, the accessible
information does not obey the property of total proportion-
ality [2]. This implies that the accessible information is, in
general, not stable under loss of information to Eve. That is,
if Eve obtains k bits of side information about the message
there is no guarantee that her accessible information will in-
crease by a proportionate amount (and indeed it can increase
by an arbitrarily large amount according to the QDL effect).
While it is clear that at a certain point Eve has to measure
her share of the quantum state, the accessible information cri-
terion is sensitive to the time at which such a measurement
takes place. If Eve obtains a small amount of side informa-
tion before she measures her share, then she could use this
information to increase her accessible information by a dis-
proportionate amount. As a consequence, accessible infor-
mation security is not, in general, composable [13], that is,
a protocol that is secure according to the accessible informa-
tion criterion may not remain so when used as a subroutine of
another communication protocol. On the other hand, if Eve
obtains k bits of side information after the measurement, then
(since the classical mutual information obeys total proportion-
ality) her accessible information cannot increase by more than
k bits and composable security will be granted [18].
As is customary in quantum key distribution, our secret key
generation protocol is divided in two parts. The first part is
a QDL protocol in which Alice encodes her share of the raw
key into quantum states and sends them to Bob via an inse-
cure quantum channel. After Bob measures the output of the
channel he obtains his own share of the raw key that has to be
reconciled with Alice’s one. The security of this part of the
protocol is granted by the QDL effect and is quantified by the
accessible information. In the second part of the protocol Al-
ice sends error correcting information to Bob through a public
channel (in our case there is no need for privacy amplification
since the raw key is already secure due to QDL [19]). We are
hence in a situation where the QDL protocol is used as sub-
routine of the key distribution protocol. This implies that the
latter will be secure only if the former is secure in the com-
posable sense. As discussed above, this is, in general, true
only under the assumption that Eve has already measured her
share of the quantum state when the second part of the proto-
col takes place. If Alice knows that Eve’s quantum memory
has a coherence time not larger than τ , then she can simply
wait for a sufficiently long time before sending error correct-
ing information to Bob through the public channel. After such
a time Eve has either made a measurement or her quantum
memory has completely decohered. In both cases the security
of the QDL protocol will be composable.
For any value of τ Alice and Bob can apply a doubly-
blocked communication protocol, where they first send a data
packet down the quantum channel, and then wait a time τ be-
fore doing all the required classical post-processing. In the
meantime Alice can keep sending Bob independent data pack-
ets that will be processed at a later time. The larger τ is, the
longer Alice and Bob have to wait to guarantee the security
of the protocol. Clearly, too large values of τ would make the
protocol unpractical. However, it is worth remarking that from
an abstract point of view, in a stationary regime the asymptotic
communication is independent of τ and it remains finite even
in the limit τ →∞.
Accessible information security.– Our starting point is a
new QDL protocol defined for a memoryless d-dimensional
channel (for any d ≥ 3). Upon n uses of the qudit channel
N , the protocol allows one to lock classical information using
an ensemble of input codewords E that are separable among
different channel uses. The protocol requires Alice and Bob
to initially share a secret key of logKn bits, which is con-
sumed at an asymptotic rate of limn→∞ 1n logKn = 1 bit per
channel use.
Let us fix a qudit basis {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d and its Fourier conju-
gate {|m〉}m=1,...,d, with
|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d|ω〉 . (5)
We consider the “phase ensemble” of qudit unitary transfor-
mations of the form:
U =
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉〈ω| , (6)
where the angles θ(ω), for ω = 1, . . . , d, are d i.i.d. ran-
dom variables. We require that these variables are distributed
3in such a way that E[eiθ(ω)] = 0 [21]. To define the QDL
protocol upon n uses of the channel, Alice and Bob pub-
licly agree on a set of Kn n-qudit unitaries of the form
{⊗nj=1U jk}k=1,...,Kn . The value of the index k plays the role
of a secret key of logKn bits initially shared by Alice and
Bob. Alice prepares with equal probability one of the dn or-
thogonal vectors |m〉 = ⊗nj=1|mj〉 (the n log d bits string m
will serve as a raw key for Alice), and then scrambles it by
applying one of the unitary transformations, yielding
|Ψmk〉 = ⊗nj=1U jk |mj〉 =
∑
ω
ei
∑n
j=1[2πm
jωj/d+θj
k
(ωj)]
√
dn
|ω〉 .
(7)
We first prove that if Eve (who does not know the value
of the index k) intercepts the whole train of qudit systems and
measures them, then she can only retrieve a negligible amount
of information about the input variable m. In particular, we
show that there exist choices of the scrambling unitaries U jk
that guarantee that Eve’s accessible information is arbitrarily
small if n is large enough. To prove this, we show that this
property is almost certainly true if each U jk is sampled i.i.d.
from the phase ensemble of unitaries [22].
Let Eve intercept and measure the train of n qudits sent by
Alice. A measurement is described by a collection of POVM
elements {µi|Φi〉〈Φi|}i, where
∑
i µi = d
n
, µi > 0 and |Φi〉
are unit vectors (possibly entangled over the n qudit systems).
Since Eve does not have access to the secret key, we have to
compute the accessible information of the ensemble of states
E = {pm, 1Kn
∑Kn
k=1 |Ψmk〉〈Ψmk|}, averaged over the val-
ues of the secret key, where pm = 1/dn is the probability of
the message m. A straightforward calculation then yields
Iacc (E) = log dn − min
{µi|Φi〉〈Φi|}
∑
i
µi
dn
H [Q(Φi)] , (8)
whereQ(Φ) denotes the dn-dimensional real vector with non-
negative entries
Qm(Φ) =
1
Kn
Kn∑
k=1
|〈Φ|Ψmk〉|2 , (9)
and
H [Q(Φ)] = −
∑
m
Qm(Φ) logQm(Φ) (10)
is its Shannon entropy (notice that∑
m
Qm(Φ) = 1).
Since
∑
i µi/d
n = 1, the positive coefficients µi/dn can be
interpreted as probability weights. We can then apply a stan-
dard convexity argument (the minimum is never larger than
the average) to obtain an upper bound on Eve’s accessible in-
formation:
Iacc (E) ≤ log dn −min
|Φ〉
H [Q(Φ)] , (11)
where the minimum is over all n-qudit unit vectors. Accord-
ing to this expression, an upper bound on the accessible infor-
mation follows from a lower bound on the minimum Shannon
entropy min|Φ〉 H [Q(Φ)].
To show that Iacc (E) can be made arbitrarily small, we
apply concentration inequalities [23, 24] to the quantities
Qm(Φ)’s. Notice that the latter are random variables if the
unitaries U jk are chosen randomly from the phase ensemble.
The main idea is that the Qm(Φ)’s will concentrate around
their mean value 1/dn. We prove (see [25]) that the probabil-
ity of a deviation larger than ǫ/dn is exponentially suppressed.
This property will be used to show that Iacc (E) . ǫ log dn (up
to a probability exponentially small in dn). In order for this
to be true, the number of different scrambling unitaries has to
satisfy [27]
Kn > 2
n+1
(
1
ǫ2
ln dn +
2
ǫ3
log
5
ǫ
)
. (12)
This implies an asymptotic secret key consumption rate of
limn→∞
1
n logKn = 1 bit per channel use. We remark that
we can put ǫ = 2−nc , for any c < 1, and still lock data with a
secret key consumption rate of 1 bit independently of d.
Secret key generation.– As an example, we consider the
case of a collective attack by Eve, which induces the mem-
oryless qudit channel N from Alice to Bob. (Since our QDL
is secure in the strong locking sense, it will be secure also
in the case of general coherent attacks.) For any given value
of k Bob receives one of the dn equiprobable n-qudit states
N⊗n (|Ψmk〉〈Ψmk|) at the output of the channel. For the
sake of simplicity we consider the case of unitarily covari-
ant channels, that is, satisfying N (UρU †) = UN (ρ)U † for
any qudit unitary U . (For example, this is the case of the
erasure and depolarizing channels.) To decrypt the message
Bob can apply the inverse unitary ⊗nj=1U jk
−1
. After the de-
cryption, Bob obtains n independent instances of the qudit en-
semble of output states {1/d,N (|m〉〈m|)}. To decode, Bob
applies a measurement on these states, obtaining a raw key
mˆ given by the measurement outcomes. Finally, to distill a
perfectly correlated key Alice should send error correcting in-
formation to Bob. If Bob makes the optimal measurement,
they will asymptotically achieve about nχN (E) bits of com-
mon randomness, where χN (E) = S[ 1d
∑
mN (|m〉〈m|)] −
1
d
∑
m S[N (|m〉〈m|)] is the Holevo information of the chan-
nel [28]. At this stage we make use of the assumption that
Alice knows an upper bound τ on the coherence time of
Eve’s quantum memory. Since the error correcting informa-
tion will be transmitted on a public communication channel,
Alice must wait for a time larger than τ before being able to
safely send error correcting information to Bob. In this way
Alice and Bob establish a secret key of about nχN (E) bits
starting from one of about n bits. If χN (E) > 1, they can
then run the protocol again by recycling part of the obtained
secret key and achieve an overall asymptotic rate of secret key
generation of R = χN (E) − 1 bits per channel use.
In particular, for a unitarily covariant channel, such as the
qudit erasure channel and the qudit depolarizing channel, the
Holevo information χN (E) equals the classical capacity CN :
hence, QDL allows for a secret key generation rate of R =
CN − 1 bits, just one bit below the channel classical capacity.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the secret key generation
rates of our protocol R = CN − 1 with the classical capac-
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FIG. 1: Comparison of several communication rates (in bits per
channel use). Left: asymptotic rates for the qudit erasure channel
as a function of the erasure probability p. QDL secret key genera-
tion rate (solid line); private capacity P = (1 − 2p) log d (dashed
line); classical capacity C = (1− p) log d (dash-dotted line). Right:
asymptotic rates for the qudit depolarizing channel as function of the
depolarizing probability p. QDL secret key generation rate (solid
line); asymptotic secret key generation rate achieved by the proto-
col in [29] (we notice incidentally that this rate achieves the Hashing
bound) (dashed line); classical capacity (dash-dotted line).
ity and the private capacity (which equals the secret key gen-
eration rate with the assistance of 1-way public communica-
tion from Alice to Bob) for the qudit erasure and depolarizing
channels.
Conclusions.– According to the QDL effect, a large gap ex-
ists between two natural security definitions, one related to
the Holevo information and the other to the accessible infor-
mation (the difference between these two entropic quantities is
known as quantum discord [30]). In this Letter we have shown
that, if the latter criterion is assumed, one can generate a se-
cret key through a memoryless noisy channel at a rate as high
as the classical capacity minus one bit, independently of the
channel private capacity. The price to pay for such a high rate
of secret key generation is that the accessible information cri-
terion does not guarantee unconditional and composable secu-
rity. Our protocol guarantees composable security under the
assumption that Alice and Bob know that the coherence time
of Eve’s quantum memory is no larger than τ . Interestingly
enough, the key generation rate is independent on the value
of τ , as long as Alice and Bob know this value (though large
values of τ would make the protocol unpractical).
One should also ensure that the QDL is robust under leak-
age to Eve of a small fraction of the key or the message. In-
deed, as a small key allows one to (un)lock a disproportion-
ate amount of information, it could very well happen that the
leakage to Eve of a few bits may allow her to uncover a much
larger portion of the message. This problem has been recently
addressed in [8], where it is shown that there exist QDL proto-
cols that can be made resilient to loss of a given amount of in-
formation by increasing the secret key consumption by a pro-
portional amount. The conclusions of [8] may be straightfor-
wardly generalized to the protocol discussed here, and hence
applied to guarantee the robustness of our QDL protocol for
noisy channels.
The QDL states and unitaries in Eqs. (A1) and (6) are par-
ticularly suitable for quantum optics applications, where a qu-
dit can be encoded by coherently splitting a single photon over
dmodes (e.g., path, temporal, linear momentum, orbital angu-
lar momentum) and then by applying i.i.d. random phases to
the different modes by modulating an array of phase shifters.
For example, this kind of transformation can be implemented
by group velocity dispersion and our protocol can be realized
by a simple modification of standard d-dimensional quantum
key distribution protocols, see e.g., [31]. As discussed in [10]
this requires passive linear optical transformations and photo
detection. In the unary encoding of a single photon over d
modes, linear losses are modeled by a qudit erasure chan-
nel, and the depolarizing channel model provides a standard
benchmark for assessing the performance of quantum key dis-
tribution. Different channel models reflect different collective
attacks conducted by the eavesdropper. While the final key
generation rate may depend on the channel model, the security
of our QDL protocol (which holds in the strong locking sense)
does not depend on the details of the channel, and it also holds
in the case of coherent attacks. Finally, let us remark that un-
like previous QDL protocols the one presented here does not
require d to be arbitrarily large. Instead, our protocol requires
an increasing number of channel uses (as typical of i.i.d. in-
formation theory) while it is sufficient to assume d ≥ 3.
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Supplemental Material
Appendix A: A quantum data locking protocol with separable
codewords
Let us consider a d-dimensional Hilbert space endowed
with an orthonormal basis {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d and its Fourier-
conjugate basis {|m〉}m=1,...,d,
|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d|ω〉 . (A1)
Given a collection of n qudit systems, we consider the product
basis vectors |m〉 = ⊗nj=1|mj〉. To encode the message m =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mn), Alice prepares the state |m〉. Alice and
Bob publicly agree on a subset of K n-qudit unitaries
Uk =
n⊗
j=1
U jk , (A2)
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , where the single-qudit unitary acting on
the j-th system is of the form
U jk =
d−1∑
ωj=0
eiθ
j
k
(ωj)|ωj〉〈ωj | . (A3)
According to the value of a pre-shared secret key, k =
1, 2, . . . ,K , Alice and Bob privately agree on using one of
these unitaries for locking the codewords. Alice applies the
unitary transformation Uk on the n-qudit codeword, obtaining
|Ψmk〉 = Uk|m〉 =
n⊗
j=1
U jk |mj〉 (A4)
=
1√
dn
∑
ω
ei
∑
n
j=1[2πm
jωj/d+θj
k
(ωj)]|ω〉 ,(A5)
where ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) and |ω〉 = ⊗nj=1|ωj〉. Notice
that, for any given k, the vectors {|Ψm〉}m define a new basis
for the n-qudit system.
We consider the “phase ensemble” of qudit unitary trans-
formations of the form:
U =
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉〈ω| , (A6)
where the angles θ(ω), for ω = 1, . . . , d, are d i.i.d. random
variables. We require that these variables are distributed in
such a way that E[eiθ(ω)] = 0.
Below we show that, if the unitaries U jk are randomly cho-
sen, identically and independently, from the phase ensemble,
then the data locking protocol will succeed with a probabil-
ity arbitrary close to 1 if n is large enough. In particular, this
protocol requires a secret key of logK ≃ n bits, that is, the
protocol consumes secret key at an asymptotic rate of 1 bit per
data-locked qudit.
1. Some preliminary results
To characterize our QDL protocol we will make use of two
concentration inequalities. The first one is the Maurer tail
bound [1]:
Theorem 1 Let {Xt}t=1,...,T be T i.i.d. non-negative real-
valued random variables, with Xt ∼ X and E[X ],E[X2] <
∞. Then, for any τ > 0 we have that
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt < E[X ]− τ
}
≤ exp
(
− Tτ
2
2E[X2]
)
.
(Pr{x} denotes the probability that the proposition x is true.)
The second one is the operator Chernoff bound [2]:
Theorem 2 Let {Xt}t=1,...,T be T i.i.d. random variables
taking values in the algebra of hermitian operators in dimen-
sion D, with 0 ≤ Xt ≤ I and E[Xt] = µI (I is the identity
operator). Then, for any τ > 0 we have that
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt > (1 + τ)µI
}
≤ D exp
(
−Tτ
2µ
4 ln2
)
.
6For any given dn-dimensional unit vector |Φ〉, m and k, we
define the quantity
qmk(Φ) = |〈Φ|Ψmk〉|2 , (A7)
which is a function of the codeword |Ψmk〉 defined by
Eq. (A5). Notice that qmk(Φ) is a random variable for a ran-
dom choice of the set of scrambling unitaries {Uk}k=1,...,K
To apply Theorems 1 and 2, we compute the first and second
moments of qmk(Φ) with respect to the i.i.d. random unitaries
sampled from the phase ensemble. Putting |Φ〉 =∑
ω
Φω|ω〉,
we have
E[qmk(Φ)] =
1
dn
∑
ω,ω′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′ e
i
∑
n
j=1 2πm
j(ωj−ω′j)/d
E
[
ei
∑n
j=1[θ
j(ωj)−θj(ω′j)]
]
(A8)
=
1
dn
∑
ω,ω′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′ e
i
∑
n
j=1 2πm
j(ωj−ω′j)/d
n∏
j=1
E
[
eiθ
j(ωj)−iθj(ω′j)
]
(A9)
=
1
dn
∑
ω,ω′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′ e
i
∑
n
j=1 2πm
j(ωj−ω′j)/d
n∏
j=1
δωjω′j (A10)
=
1
dn
∑
ω,ω′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′
n∏
j=1
δωjω′j =
1
dn
, (A11)
and
E[qmk(Φ)
2] =
1
d2n
∑
ω,ω′,ω′′,ω′′′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′Φ
∗
ω
′′Φω′′′ e
i
∑n
j=1
2πmj(ωj−ω′j+ω′′j−ω′′′j)/d
× E
[
ei
∑n
j=1[θ
j(ωj)−θj(ω′j)+θj(ω′′j)−θj(ω′′′j)]
]
(A12)
=
1
d2n
∑
ω,ω′,ω′′,ω′′′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′Φ
∗
ω
′′Φω′′′ e
i
∑n
j=1 2πm
j(ωj−ω′j+ω′′j−ω′′′j)/d
×
n∏
j=1
E
[
eiθ
j(ωj)−iθj(ω′j)+iθj(ω′′j)−iθj(ω′′′j)
]
(A13)
=
1
d2n
∑
ω,ω′,ω′′,ω′′′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′Φ
∗
ω
′′Φω′′′ e
i
∑
n
j=1
2πmj(ωj−ω′j+ω′′j−ω′′′j)/d
×
n∏
j=1
δωjω′jδω′′jω′′′j + δωjω′′′jδω′jω′′j
1 + δωjω′′j
(A14)
=
1
d2n
∑
ω,ω′,ω′′,ω′′′
Φ∗
ω
Φω′Φ
∗
ω
′′Φω′′′
n∏
j=1
δωjω′jδω′′jω′′′j + δωjω′′′jδω′jω′′j
1 + δωjω′′j
. (A15)
One can show that (see Section B):
E[qmk(Φ)
2] ≤ 2
n
d2n
. (A16)
For any given |Φ〉 and m we define the quantity Qm(Φ) by
taking the average over k:
Qm(Φ) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
qmk(Φ) . (A17)
Notice that for k 6= k′, |Ψmk〉 and |Ψmk′〉 are statistically
independent, and so are qmk(Φ) and qmk′(Φ). We can hence
apply Maurer’s tail bound (Theorem 1). We obtain that for
any given |Φ〉 and m:
Pr
{
Qm(Φ) <
1− ǫ
dn
}
≤ exp
(
− Kǫ
2
2n+1
)
. (A18)
We then apply the operator Chernoff bound (Theorem 2) to
the operators |Ψmk〉〈Ψmk|. Notice that E[qmk(Φ)] = 1/dn
[Eq. (A11)] implies
E[|Ψmk〉〈Ψmk|] = I
dn
. (A19)
7The operator Chernoff bound then yields that for any given m
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
|Ψmk〉〈Ψmk| > (1 − δ)I
}
≤ dn exp
(
−K(d
n(1− δ)− 1)2
dn4 ln 2
)
(A20)
= dn exp
(
−Kd
n(1− δ − 1/dn)2
4 ln 2
)
. (A21)
This result in turn implies that for any given m
Pr
{
max
|Φ〉
Qm(Φ) > 1− δ
}
≤ dn exp
(
−Kd
n(1− δ − 1/dn)2
4 ln 2
)
. (A22)
Finally, to optimize Eve’s measurement on her share of the
quantum state, we will make use of the notion of ǫ-net. An
ǫ-net is a finite set of unit vectors Nǫ = {|Φi〉}i in a D-
dimensional Hilbert space such that for any unit vector |Φ〉
there exists |Φi〉 ∈ Nǫ such that
‖|Φ〉〈Φ| − |Φi〉〈Φi|‖1 ≤ ǫ . (A23)
As discussed in [3] there exists an ǫ-net such that |Nǫ| ≤
(5/ǫ)2D.
2. Eve’s accessible information
In the strong locking scenario, we assume that Eve inter-
cepts the whole train of qudit systems and measures them.
To evaluate the security of the QDL protocol according to
the accessible information criterion, we show that there ex-
ist choices of the scrambling unitaries U jk ’s that guarantee
Eve’s accessible information to be arbitrarily small if n is
large enough. To prove that we show that this property is true
with a non-zero probability for a random choice of the uni-
taries U jk ’s. The proof strategy is analogous to the one of [4]
and is based on similar ideas already applied to other QDL
protocols [3, 5].
Let Eve intercept and measure the train of n qudits sent
by Alice. A measurement is described by the POVM ele-
ments {µi|Φi〉〈Φi|}i, where
∑
i µi = d
n
, µi > 0 and |Φi〉
are unit vectors (possibly entangled over the n qudit systems).
Since Eve does not have access to the secret key, we have to
compute the accessible information of the ensemble of states
E = {pm, 1K
∑K
k=1 |Ψmk〉〈Ψmk|}, where pm is the proba-
bility of the message m. For the sake of simplicity here we
assume that all the messages have equal probability, that is,
pm = 1/d
n (the case of non-uniform distribution was consid-
ered in [5, 6]). A straightforward calculation then yields
Iacc (E) = log dn − min
{µi|Φi〉〈Φi|}
∑
i
µi
dn
H [Q(Φi)] , (A24)
whereQ(Φ) denotes the dn-dimensional real vector with non-
negative entries
Qm(Φ) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
|〈Φ|Ψmk〉|2 = 1
K
K∑
k=1
qmk(Φ) , (A25)
and
H [Q(Φ)] = −
∑
m
Qm(Φ) logQm(Φ) (A26)
is its Shannon entropy (notice that∑
m
Qm(Φ) = 1).
Since
∑
i µi/d
n = 1, the positive coefficients µi/dn can be
interpreted as probability weights. We can then apply a stan-
dard convexity argument (the minimum is never larger than
the average) to obtain an upper bound on Eve’s accessible in-
formation:
Iacc (E) ≤ log dn −min
|Φ〉
H [Q(Φ)] , (A27)
where the minimum is over all n-qudit unit vectors. Accord-
ing to this expression, an upper bound on the accessible infor-
mation follows from a lower bound on the minimum Shannon
entropy min|Φ〉 H [Q(Φ)].
In order to prove that Iacc (E) ≤ ǫ log dn, we need to show
that min|Φ〉 H [Q(Φ)] ≥ (1− ǫ) log dn. To do that, for any
ǫ > 0 and dn and K large enough we bound the probability
that
−Qm(Φ) logQm(Φ) < η
(
1− ǫ
dn
)
, (A28)
where η(x) := −x log x. This is obtained by bounding the
probability that either Qm(Φ) < λ− or Qm(Φ) > λ+, where
λ− = (1 − ǫ)/dn and λ+ = 1 − η
(
1−ǫ
dn
)
+ O
(
η
(
1−ǫ
dn
))
.
Notice that for dn sufficiently large and/or ǫ sufficiently small
we have λ+ ≥ 1− 2η
(
1−ǫ
dn
)
.
From Eq. (A22) and applying the union bound we obtain
8Pr
{
max
|Φ〉,m
Qm(Φ) > λ+
}
≤ Pr
{
max
|Φ〉,m
Qm(Φ) > 1− 2η
(
1− ǫ
dn
)}
(A29)
≤ dnPr
{
max
|Φ〉
Qm(Φ) > 1− 2η
(
1− ǫ
dn
)}
(A30)
≤ d2n exp
(
−Kd
n(1− 2η ( 1−ǫdn )− 1/dn)2
4 ln 2
)
(A31)
≤ exp
(
ln d2n − Kd
n(1− 2η ( 1−ǫdn )− 1/dn)2
4 ln 2
)
(A32)
≤ exp
(
ln d2n − Kd
n(1− 4η ( 1−ǫdn )− 2/dn)
4 ln 2
)
(A33)
≤ exp
(
ln d2n − Kd
n(1− 6η ( 1−ǫdn ))
4 ln 2
)
=: p+ , (A34)
where we have also used the fact that 1dn < η
(
1−ǫ
dn
)
for n large enough. This probability vanishes exponentially with dn
provided that K > ln d2ndn
4 ln 2
1−6η[(1−ǫ)/dn] .
Then, for any given |Φ〉 we use Eq. (A18) and apply again the union bound to obtain
Pr {∃m1, . . . ,mℓ | ∀i Qmi(Φ) < λ−} = Pr
{
∃m1, . . . ,mℓ | ∀i Qmi(Φ) <
1− ǫ
dn
}
(A35)
≤
(
dn
ℓ
)(
Pr
{
Qm(Φ) <
1− ǫ
dn
})ℓ
(A36)
≤
(
dn
ℓ
)
exp
(
− ℓKǫ
2
2n+1
)
(A37)
≤ (dn)ℓ exp
(
− ℓKǫ
2
2n+1
)
(A38)
= exp
(
ℓ ln dn − ℓKǫ
2
2n+1
)
. (A39)
Putting ℓ = ǫdn we have
Pr {∃m1, . . . ,mℓ | ∀i Qmi(Φ) < λ−}
≤ exp
[
−dn
(
Kǫ3
2n+1
− ǫ lndn
)]
=: p− . (A40)
Notice that this probability is also exponentially small in dn,
provided that K > 2n+1ǫ−2 ln dn.
Inequality (A40) implies that with probability greater than
1 − p− there are at least dn − ℓ = (1 − ǫ)dn values of m
such that Qm(Φ) > λ−. Also, according to Eq. (A34), with
probability at least equal to 1− p+ all the Qm(Φ)’s are larger
than λ+. Putting these results together we have that
H [Q(Φ)] > −(1− ǫ)dn
(
1− ǫ
dn
log
1− ǫ
dn
)
(A41)
= −(1− ǫ)2 log 1− ǫ
dn
(A42)
> (1− 2ǫ) log dn − (1− 2ǫ) log (1 − ǫ) (A43)
> (1− 2ǫ) log dn (A44)
with a probability at least equal to 1− p− − p+. For dn large
enough this probability is larger than 1− 2p−.
The last step is to introduce an ǫ-net Nǫ = {|Φi〉}i. Let us
recall that the ǫ-net can be chosen to contain less than (5/ǫ)2dn
elements. We can hence apply the union bound to obtain:
Pr
{
min
|Φi〉∈Nǫ
H [Q(Φi)] < (1 − 2ǫ) log dn
}
≤ (5/ǫ)2dn 2p− (A45)
= 2(5/ǫ)2d
n
exp
[
−dn
(
Kǫ3
2n+1
− ǫ lndn
)]
(A46)
= 2 exp
[
−dn
(
Kǫ3
2n+1
− ǫ ln dn − 2 log 5
ǫ
)]
. (A47)
Finally, we have to replace the minimum over vectors in the
ǫ-net with a minimum over all unit vectors. An application of
9the Fannes inequality [7] yields (see also [3])∣∣∣∣min|Φ〉 H [Q(Φ)]− min|Φi〉∈NǫH [Q(Φi)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ log dn + η(ǫ) .
(A48)
This result implies
Pr
{
min
|Φ〉
H [Q(Φ)] < (1 − 3ǫ) log dn − η(ǫ)
}
≤ 2 exp
[
−dn
(
Kǫ3
2n+1
− ǫ ln dn − 2 log 5
ǫ
)]
, (A49)
that is,
Pr
{
max
|Φ〉
Iacc > 3ǫ log d
n + η(ǫ)
}
≤ 2 exp
[
−dn
(
Kǫ3
2n+1
− ǫ ln dn − 2 log 5
ǫ
)]
. (A50)
Such a probability is bounded away from one (and goes to
zero exponentially in dn) provided
K > 2n+1
(
1
ǫ2
ln dn +
2
ǫ3
log
5
ǫ
)
. (A51)
In conclusion, we have proven that there exist QDL codes
allowing Alice and Bob to lock data through n uses of a noise-
less memoryless qudit channel in such a way that Eve’s ac-
cessible information is Iacc(E) = O (ǫ log dn). These codes
are defined by codewords that are separable among different
channel uses. The rate of locked communication is of log d
bits per channel use and require the pre-shared secret key to
be consumed at an asymptotic rate of limn→∞ 1n logK = 1
bit per channel use. Notice that we can put ǫ = 2−nc , with
any positive c < 1 and still lock data with a secret key con-
sumption rate of 1 bit independently of d.
Appendix B: Second moment of qmk(Φ)
Let us put
gωω′ω′′ω′′′ =
n∏
j=1
δωjω′jδω′′jω′′′j + δωjω′′′jδω′jω′′j
1 + δωjω′′j
. (B1)
Notice gωω′ω′′ω′′′ takes values in {0, 1} and that the number
of times it is equal to 1 is (2d2 − d)n. Then we have (summa-
tion over repeated indexes is assumed)
f(Φ) = d2n E[qmk(Φ)
2] = gωω′ω′′ω′′′Φ
∗
ω
Φω′Φ
∗
ω
′′Φω′′′ .(B2)
Let us define the d2n × d2n matrix G with entries:
G
(n)
ωω
′′,ω′ω′′′ := gωω′ω′′ω′′′ , (B3)
where ωω′′ and ω′ω′′′ are respectively row and column in-
dexes. Then we have
f(Φ) ≤ ‖G(n)‖∞ , (B4)
where ‖G(n)‖∞ denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the ma-
trix G(n). We then notice that G(n) = G⊗n, where G is the
d2 × d2 matrix with entries (no summation over repeated in-
dexes)
Gωω′′,ω′ω′′′ =
δωω′δω′′ω′′′ + δωω′′′δω′ω′′
1 + δωω′′
= δωω′δω′′ω′′′ + δωω′′′δω′ω′′ − δωω′δω′ω′′δω′′ω′′′ . (B5)
We have
G = I + S − P ≤ I + S , (B6)
where I is the d2 × d2 identity matrix, S is the swap ma-
trix, and P is the positive semidefinite matrix with entries
Pωω′′,ω′ω′′′ = δωω′δω′ω′′δω′′ω′′′ .
Since I and S are unitary (and hermitian) their eigenval-
ues are not greater than 1, which implies ‖G‖∞ ≤ 2 and
‖G(n)‖∞ ≤ 2n. In conclusion we obtain f(Φ) ≤ 2n and
E[qmk(Φ)
2] ≤ 2n/d2n.
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